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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Veronica Lynn Calver appeals from her conviction for felony custodial 
interference. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Veronica Lynn Calver married Raymond Calver in 2005 in Las Vegas. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.146, L.13 - p.149, L.7.) Their son, R.C., was born in December 
2008. (12/20/11 Tr., p.149, Ls.10-14.) The Calvers moved to Boise in 2009. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.156, Ls.6-7.) At some point prior to July 2011, the Calvers 
began discussing moving to Tennessee to be closer to Veronica's family. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.5-24; p.177, L.23 - p.180, L.3.) However, the 
relationship deteriorated and Calver kicked Raymond out of their house in July 
2011. (12/20/11 Tr., p.25, L.11-p.28, L.18; p.176, L.7-p.177, L.22.) 
At some point after this separation, Calver informed Raymond that she 
intended to move to Tennessee with R.C. and her two children from a previous 
relationship. (12/20/11 Tr., p.37, L.18-p.38, L.16; p.180, LA-p.188, L.1.) In 
August 2011, Raymond filed for divorce. (12/20/11 Tr., p.34, L.8-16; p.37, L.20 
- p.38, L.16.) The Ada County magistrate court entered a joint temporary 
restraining order. (State's exhibit 1.) The order, among other things, prohibited 
both Raymond and Calver from U[r]emoving any minor child of the parties who 
reside in Idaho from the State of Idaho (except for periods of time not exceeding 
72 hours)" without specific written consent of the parties or by order of the court. 
(Id.) Raymond employed his brother Forrest to serve the order and other 
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divorce papers on Calver on August 30, 2011. (12/19/11 Tr., p.147, L.9 - p.152, 
L. 7; 12/20/11 Tr., p.34, L.8 - p.35, L.4; State's exhibit 2.) 
Shortly thereafter, without Raymond's consent, Calver took RCo and her 
other two children and left Idaho. (12/20/11 Tr., p.42, L.12 - p.46, L.5; p.196, 
L.19 - p.198, L.20.) However, Calver's vehicle broke down in Tremonton, Utah. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.199, Ls.5-13.) At the scene of the breakdown, Calver had a 
panic attack, and was transported to a local hospital. (12/20/11 Tr., p.200, L.2 -
p.201, L.16.) 
Meanwhile, Raymond contacted law enforcement when he realized 
Calver and RC. had moved out of their Boise apartment. (12/20/11 Tr., p.42, 
L.12 - p.43, L.24.) Raymond informed Officer Kristopher Olsen that he 
suspected Calver had taken the children out of state. (12/19/11 Tr., p.123, 
Ls.10-21.) Officer Olsen contacted Calver's mother in Tennessee and informed 
her that he was trying to get in touch with Calver. (12/19/11 Tr., p.124, Ls.1-22.) 
Calver then contacted Officer Olsen from Utah. (12/19/11 Tr., p.124, 
L.17 - p.130, L.2; State's exhibit 3.) During this conversation, Officer Olsen 
discussed the joint temporary restraining order, which Calver denied that she 
had been legally served. (State's exhibit 3.) Officer Olsen told Calver that if she 
did not return RC. to the state she may be subject to prosecution for felony 
custodial interference. (ld.,6:53-7:16.) Calver asserted that someone from the 
police department, who happened to be nearby at the time of Forrest's service 
of the order and divorce papers, had informed her that Forrest's attempted 
service was not legal. (Id., 7:17 - 7:40.) Calver continued that she believed that 
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due to this "loophole," she could take RC. to Tennessee. (ld.) Calver indicated 
that she took the children out of state due to Raymond's drug use and violent 
behavior, and because of a recent incident during which she alleged Raymond 
"dared" her older son to cross a dangerous river during a camping trip. (State's 
exhibit 3; see also 12/20/11 Tr., p.161, L.9 - p.173, L.9.) 
Calver, still in Utah, then spoke with Garden City police officer John 
Brumbaugh. (12/20/11 Tr., p.90, L.10 - p.92, L.15; state's exhibit 4.) Officer 
Brumbaugh informed Calver that he could seek a felony arrest warrant for 
custodial interference if Calver did not return to Idaho with R.C. (State's exhibit 
4, 13:11 - 15:32.) Officer Brumbaugh also faxed copies of the divorce 
documents, including the joint temporary restraining order, to Calver in Utah. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.92, L.20 - p.93, L.16.) A short time later, Calver's parents came 
to Utah and took Calver and the children to Tennessee, where they arrived 
around September 15 or 16, 2011. (12/20/11, p.209, L.11- p.210, L.21.) 
The state charged Calver with felony custodial interference. (R, pp.29-
30.) Calver was arrested in Tennessee on September 26, 2011, and 
transported back to Idaho. (R, pp.9-11; 12/20/11 Tr., p.219, L.16 - p.220, 
L.10.) At trial, Calver primarily employed a necessity defense, arguing that she 
had to take RC. and her other children from Idaho to protect them from 
Raymond's alteged violent behavior and drug use. (12/20/11 Tr., p.273, L.24 -
p.287, L.19.) The jury found Calver guilty of felony custodial interference. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.291, L.18 - p.292, L.1.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
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placed Calver on probation for five years. (R., pp.91-97.) Calver timely 
appealed. (R., pp.98-100.) 
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ISSUES 
Calver states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court vacate Ms. Calver's conviction for 
custodial interference as the State failed to provide sufficient 
evidence that Ms. Calver was "without lawful authority" to 
take, keep or withhold R.C. from Raymond Calver? 
2. Was Ms. Calver's right to due process of law violated by the 
district court erroneously instructing the jury that Ms. Calver 
could be convicted of child custody interference on the 
findings of facts necessary to support a guilty verdict? 
3. Does there exist a fatal variance between the Information 
and the jury instructions, as the jury instructions advised that 
Raymond Calver's custodial rights could arise either from a 
custodial order, as alleged in the Information, or from his 
equal custodial rights as a parent, which was not alleged in 
the Information? 
(Appellant's brief, p.?) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Calver failed to show that the evidence of her guilt presented at trial 
was insufficient to support her conviction? 
2. Has Calver failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions? 
3. Has Calver failed to show fundamental error entitling her to appellate 




The Evidence Of Calver's Guilt Presented At Trial Was Sufficient To Support 
Her Conviction For Felony Custodial Interference 
A. Introduction 
Calver contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support her conviction for felony custodial interference. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-
16.) Specifically, she contends that the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence either that she "acted without lawful authority," or that Raymond Calver 
possessed adequate custodial rights to have been unlawfully deprived of R.C. 
(ld.) However, a review of the record reveals that the state presented 
substantial competent evidence from which the jury could conclude that Calver 
was guilty of felony custodial interference. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288,292,955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting 
this review, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the finder of 
fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 
292,955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 
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1991); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed 
in favor of upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P .2d at 607; Hart, 
112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
C. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support Calver's Conviction 
Idaho Code § 18-4506 defines felony child custody interference, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
1. A person commits child custody interference if the person, 
whether a parent or other, or agent of that person, 
intentionally and without lawful authority: 
(a) Takes, entices away, keeps or withholds any minor 
child from a parent or another person or institution 
having custody, joint custody, visitation or other 
parental rights, whether such rights arise from [sic] 
temporary or permanent custody order, or from the 
equal custodial rights of each parent in the absence 
of a custody order[.] 
2. It shall be an affirmative defense to a violation of the 
provisions of subsection 1. of this section that: 
(a) The action is taken to protect the child from imminent 
physical harm; 
(b) The action is taken by a parent fleeing from imminent 
physical harm to himself[.] 
Relevant to this case, in order for a jury to find a defendant guilty of 
felony custodial interference, the state must prove that the taking or keeping 
from was conducted "without lawful authority." I.C. § 18-4506(a). The- nature of 
this element varies based on the characterization of the defendant in a particular 
case. Where the defendant is not a parent or legal custodian of the child, and 
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where there is no consent from the child's parent or legal guardian for the 
defined act or omission, the lack of lawful authority would be readily apparent. 
However, as Calver points out on appeal (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10; p.14 n.11), 
a parent, generally, has fundamental constitutional rights regarding their actions 
and omissions as they relate to raising their children. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S 390 (1923). However, a lawfully entered custodial court order can limit 
a parent's custodial rights, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944), and a parent who violates such an order through a defined act or 
omission would be doing so "without lawful authority" in violation of I.C. § 18-
4506(a). 
The state also must prove that the defendant's action or omission 
deprived the child from an individual who actually had some type of custodial 
right over the child. I.C. § 18-4506(a). A person has not violated I.C. § 18-
4506(a), for example, if she has only deprived the child from an individual, such 
as a parent who has had his or her custodial rights revoked by a court or who 
lacks adequate custodial rights regarding the child. In other words, this element 
requires that there be a qualified victim of the act or omission of the defendant. 
Idaho Code § 18-4506(a) broadly requires this victim to be either a parent, other 
individual, or institution that has "custody, joint custody, visitation or other 
parental rights" over the child. 
On appeal, Calver contends that the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence either that her act or omission in taking, keeping, or withholdiog R.C. 
was done "without lawful authority," or that Raymond was a qualified victim that 
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had adequate custodial rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-16.) However, the record 
reveals that the state presented substantial competent evidence from which the 
jury could conclude that the state proved both of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
At trial, the state presented substantial evidence from which the jury 
could find that Calver "lacked lawful authority" to take and keep R.C. out-of-state 
because she knowingly violated the joint temporary restraining order which 
prohibited both her and Raymond from taking R.C. out of state for more than 72 
hours without written consent. The joint temporary restraining order itself was 
entered into evidence. (12/19/11 Tr., p.126, L.5 - p.127, L.5; state's exhibit 1.) 
Raymond's brother, Forrest, testified that he served the order and other relevant 
divorce papers on Calver. (12/19/11 Tr., p.147, L.13 - p.152, L.7.) Specifically, 
Forrest testified that he personally handed the papers to Calver, who responded 
to the service by stating that "she would destroy [the papers] or something to 
that effect." (12/19/11 Tr., p.150, Ls.1-24.) Forrest further testified that as he 
left, Calver "was looking at the papers," and told him "she would destroy 
[Raymond Calver] and she would destroy [Forrest] too." (12/19/11 Tr., p.150, 
L.24 - p.151, L.5.) Forrest left the papers with Calver, and then left to have his 
affidavit of service notarized. (12/19/11 Tr., p.151, L.21 - p.152, L.7; state's 
exhibit 2.) This affidavit was admitted into evidence at trial. (12/19/11 Tr., 
p.147, L.16 - p.149, L.6; state's exhibit 2.) 
A jury could further reasonably infer from Calver's subsequent actions, 
statements, and trial testimony that Calver knew of the custody order prior to 
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leaving Idaho. Shortly after Forrest's service of the divorce papers, Calver, 
without Raymond's consent, took R.C. and her other two children and left Idaho. 
(12/20/11 Tr., p.42, L.12 - p.46, L.5; p.196, L.19 - p.198, L.16.) In her 
interview with Officer Olsen, conducted while she was in Utah, Calver contested 
the legality of Forrest's service, and stated that she believed a "loophole" 
permitted her to take RC. to Tennessee. (State's exhibit 3.) The jury could 
have reasonably inferred from this interview that Calver, though aware of the 
terms of the temporary joint custody order, believed it did not apply to her 
because the civil service of the documents was somehow deficient. Further, 
while Calver contended that she never looked at the divorce papers and 
temporary joint restraining order, she acknowledged at trial that she "knew [the 
order] would have to do with [RC.] [She] figured it was going to be a restraining 
order because just by what Forrest had said." (12/20/11 Tr., p.192, Ls.16-23.) 
The testimony of Forrest and Calver, Officer Olsen's recorded interview of 
Calver, the temporary joint restraining order and associated affidavit of service, 
and Calver's actions in leaving the state and then continuing on to Tennessee, 
constituted sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found that Calver 
knowingly violated the temporary joint restraining order prior to leaving Idaho, 
and thus deprived Raymond of RC. "without lawful authority." 
In addition, the state presented substantial evidence sufficient to show 
that Raymond Calver had adequate custodial rights over RC. to implicate I.C. § 
18-4506(a). It was undisputed at trial that Raymon~ was R.C.'s father, that until 
July 2011 he had custody over R.C. and lived with R.C and Veronica, and that 
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prior to the divorce filing, there were no court orders in place that impacted his 
custody of RC. (12/20/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-17; p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.5; p.149, 
Ls.8-14). Raymond was therefore clearly a qualified victim under the provisions 
of I.C. § 18-4506(a). 
On appeal, Calver incorrectly interprets these elements of I.C. § 18-4506 
as requiring something beyond what is indicated by the plain language of that 
statute. She asserts: 
The only limitation on Ms. Calver's right to parent in this case 
was the JTRO issued by a magistrate court when Mr. Calver filed 
for divorce. As such, the State could not convict Ms. Calver of 
custodial interference absent proof both that she violated specific 
terms of [the] JTRO, and that the JTRO granted Mr. Calver the very 
custodial rights Ms. Calver was alleged to have interfered with. 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) Calver further argues: 
While there is ample evidence Ms. Calver took, kept or 
withheld R C. from Mr. Calver, there is no evidence she lacked 
lawful authority to do so. The plain language of the JTRO does not 
prohibit Ms. Calver from doing any of those actions. The plain 
language does not establish Mr. Calver has any right to actual 
physical custody of RC., let alone the right to personally visit with 
him. At best, the JTRO establishes that Ms. Calver's lawful 
authority to make decisions regarding R.C.'s custody, care, and 
nurture, is limited by not allowing her to "remove" him from the 
State of Idaho for more than 72 hours. Simultaneously, this clause 
could be read to establish Mr. Calver has an interest in RC. being 
somewhere in the State of Idaho for periods up to 72 hours. 
However, the right to preclude the mother of your child from taking 
your child outside of the State for more than 72 hours, does not 
establish a right to have physical custody of the child. Ms. Calver 
was not charged with taking RC. outside of Idaho for more than 72 
hours - she was charged with taking, keeping or withholding R.C. 
from Raymond Calver who has "joint custody or other parental 
rights arising from" the JTRO. 
(Appellant's brief, p.15.) 
While it may be debatable whether the state could convict Calver, or any 
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parent, of custodial interference absent proof that she violated specific terms of 
a custodial order, 1 I.C. § 18-4506 simply did not require the state to prove that 
the order in this case specifically "granted Raymond Calver the very custodial 
rights Ms. Calver was alleged to have interfered with," or that the order 
specifically granted Raymond Calver any rights at all. Instead, this element of 
the crime simply required the state to prove that Calver kept or withheld R.C. 
from a qualified victim who had custodial rights over R.C. Indeed, the joint 
temporary restraining order did not grant custodial rights to either parent; it 
instead limited the otherwise fundamental custodial rights of both individuals. 
The state presented substantial evidence at trial to show both that Calver 
violated that order and thus acted "without lawful authority" in taking and 
keeping R.C. out of state, and also that she violated Raymond's rights by doing 
so. 
Because the state presented substantial evidence at trial sufficient for the 
jury to find that Calver committed felony custodial interference, the jury's verdict, 
and Calver's judgment of conviction, should be affirmed. 
II. 
Calver Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Calver argues that the district court erred by 
1 The state does not concede the validity of Calver's suggestion that a parent 
may never be constitutionally prosecuted under I.C. § 18-4506 for permanently 
removing a child from Idaho without the consent of the other parent where both 
parents have equal custodial rights and neither have express court-ordered 
restrictions against such out-of-state relocation. 
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failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of felony custodial 
interference. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-28.) However, a review of the relevant 
instruction reveals that Calver has failed to show error, let alone fundamental 
error, that would necessitate reversal of his conviction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,587,261 
P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147,233 P.3d 71, 78 
(2010); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002). "An 
erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions 
as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,373-74,247 P.3d 582, 
600-01 (2010)). 
C. Calver Has Failed To Carry Her Burden Of Establishing Fundamental 
Error With Respect To Her Claim Of Instructional Error 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
This same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 
30(b) ("No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction 
unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection."). Absent a timely objection, the app~IIate courts of this state will only 
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review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Calver to 
demonstrate the error she alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this three-prong test to 
Calver's claim of instructional error shows that she has failed to demonstrate 
fundamental error. 
In this case, jury instruction No.1 0 provided: 
In order for the defendant, Veronica L. Calver, to be guilty of 
Child Custody Interference, the state must prove each of the 
following: 
1. On or between September 8,2011 and October 10,2011 
2. the defendant, Veronica L. Calver, intentionally 
3. and without lawful authority 
4. took and/or kept and/or withheld 
5. a child under the age of 18 years 
6. from Raymond Calver who had the right to custody and/or 
other parental rights arising from a temporary restraining 
order regarding the child in CV-OR-2011-16503, 
7. where the defendant, with knowledge of the order, took the 
child out of state and/or did not voluntarily return the child 
unharmed. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of 
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the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
The "right to custody" includes custody, joint custody, 
visitation, or other parental rights, whether such rights arise from a 
temporary or permanent custody order or from the equal custodial 
rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order. 
It is not "without lawful authority" to take and/or keep and/or 
withhold a child if such action is taken to protect the child from 
imminent physical harm and/or such an action is taken by a parent 
fleeing from imminent physical harm to such parent. 
(R, p.80.) This instruction closely resembles approved Idaho pattern jury 
instruction ICJI 1240. 
For the first time on appeal, Calver alleges that this instruction was 
erroneous because it allowed the jury to find her guilty if it found she "kept 
and/or withheld" RC. from Raymond Calver, as an alternative to finding she 
"took" RC from Raymond. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-28.) Calver also asserts 
that the instruction should have more specifically defined the concept of "lawful 
authority" to clarify that she had fundamental custodial rights, qualified only by 
the joint temporary restraining order. (ld.) Calver's argument fails because she 
has failed to establish fundamental error. 
The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Calver to 
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 
978. Calver has failed to show that her constitutional rights were violated 
because the instructions, as a whole, do not misstate the law or permit the jury 
to convict Calver for legal conduct. 
Calver contends that the instructions permitted the jury to conviat her for 
legal conduct. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-28.) Specifically, she asserts that 
15 
because the joint temporary restraining order only prohibited her from "taking" 
R.C. out of state for more than 72 hours, the instructions were erroneous 
because they permitted the jury to find her guilty if they found that she merely 
"kept and/or withheld" R.C. from Mr. Carver. (ld.) 
However, reviewing the instructions as a whole reveals that the "kept 
and/or withheld" language in instruction no. 10 was, at worst, unnecessary and 
irrelevant to the jury's determination. Its inclusion does not amount to a 
constitutional violation. Regardless of whether the jury found that Calver took, 
kept, or withheld R.C. from Raymond, it was also required to find that Calver 
committed such an act or omission "without lawful authority." (R., p.80.) 
Calver's custodial authority was only addressed in two ways at trial - one, in 
terms of the limitations placed on it by the joint temporary restraining order 
(which prevented her from "taking" R.C. out of the state), and two, as part of her 
necessity defense in that Calver contended that she was not "without lawful 
authority" to act because she was doing so to protect R.C. and herself from 
imminent physical harm. There was no basis for the jury to find that Calver 
"kept and/or withheld" R.C. "without lawful authority," and thus, there is no bas'is 
for concluding that the jury could have convicted Calver based on legal conduct. 
Thus, while the "kept and/or withheld" language was unnecessary and irrelevant 
to the jury's determination, it did not violate Calver's constitutional rights. 
Calver has also failed to show that her constitutional rights were violated 
by the jury instruction's failure to more specifically define "lawful authority." The 
pattern jury instruction for custodial interference, ICJI 1240, does not define 
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"lawful authority" other than through its instruction that it is not without lawful 
authority to take, entice away, keep, or withhold a child if such action is taken 
either to protect the child or a parent fleeing from imminent physical harm. The 
pattern ICJI instructions are presumptively correct. State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 
140 Idaho 373, 376, 92 P.3d 704, 707 (Ct. App. 2004). While the jury 
instructions in the present case did not precisely follow ICJI 1240, they did 
include the explanation of "lawful authority" that actually appears in ICJI 1240 
and I.C. § 18-4506 - that it is not without lawful authority to take, entice away, 
keep, or withhold a child if such action is taken either to protect the child or a 
parent fleeing from imminent physical harm. Calver has failed to show that that 
the district court violated her constitutional rights by not further defining "lawful 
authority" beyond how it is defined in ICJI1240 and I.C. § 18-4506. 
Read in its totality, the challenged jury instruction correctly instructed the 
jury. The instruction did not omit any of the crime's essential elements, nor did it 
relieve the state of its duty to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
or permit it to convict Calver for legal conduct. Calver has therefore failed to 
meet her burden to show constitutional error, and has failed to satisfy the first 
prong of the Perry fundamental error analysis. 
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged 
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 
(footnote omitted). Calver cannot satisfy this element because, for the reasons 
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discussed above, she cannot show clear error. Further, she cannot show that 
the decision of her trial counsel to not object to the jury instructions was based 
on ignorance of the law or other objective shortcomings, as opposed to being 
merely a tactical decision. 
If Calver's counsel determined, based on the factors discussed above 
and the fact that Calver utilized a necessity defense at trial, that the possibility of 
the jury convicting her based on legal contact was extremely remote, counsel 
may have chosen to leave any minor instructional error intact for potential 
appellate reversal should Calver be convicted. This type of scenario does 
create the incentive to "sandbag," a tactic the fundamental error standard seeks 
to prevent. Jii., 150 Idaho at 224,245 P.3d at 976. 
On appeal, Calver appears to attempt to challenge the validity of the 
second prong of Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court's concern for "sandbagging," 
and the burden placed on defendants to show harm from unobjected-to errors. 
Specifically, Calver suggests that if the appellate court were to assume that a 
defense counsel would knowingly fail to object to error for tactical reasons in a 
given situation, it must also assume that the prosecutor knowingly failed to 
correct the error (and thus likely committed misconduct), and that the district 
court gave instructions knowing it was violating the defendant's constitutional 
rights (and was thus "unfit for the bench") (Appellant's brief, pp.23-26.) 
However, contrary to Calver's suggestion, the second prong of the Perry 
fundamental error test does not affirmatively "assume" anything about a defense 
attorney's intentions or lack thereof in failing to object to error. Instead, this test 
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seeks to discourage or prevent "sandbagging," not penalize it after it is 
affirmatively proven to have occurred. See Perry 150 Idaho at 224, 224 P.3d at 
976 ("[R]equiring a contemporaneous objection prevents the litigant from 
sandbagging the court, i.e., 'remaining silent about his objection and belatedly 
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor.'" (citations 
omitted)). To that end, a defendant fails to meet the second prong of Perry if 
there is merely a "reasonable possibility" defense counsel's failure to object was 
tactical. ~ at 229, 224 P.3d at 981. Calver is not, as she appears to suggest, 
entitled to a presumption that her counsel's decision was not tactical, particularly 
where, as here, there was a reasonable basis for not objecting. If Calver 
believes that her counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object, she 
may pursue post-conviction relief. There, "additional fact-finding may be 
conducted to determine the motivation for defense counsel's failure to object." 
The third and final element of a claim of fundamental error requires 
Calver to "demonstrate that the error affected [her] substantial rights, meaning 
i 
(in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Calver has failed to 
show that if the jury instructions omitted the "kept and/or withheld" language, 
and further defined "lawful authority" to clarify the existence of Calver's 
fundamental custodial rights, that the jury would have acquitted her of felony 
custodial interference. Calver's primary defense at trial was one of necessity, 
that she had to take R.C. and her other children from Idaho to protect them from 
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Raymond's alleged violent behavior and drug use. (12/20/11 Tr., p.273, L.24 -
p.287, L.19.) The state's case centered around Calver's intentional violation of 
the joint temporary restraining order. (12/20/11 Tr., p.261, L.12 - p.273, L.22.) 
In order for the error Calver asserts to have changed the jury's verdict, the jury 
would have had to take a different course, rejected the state's contention that 
Calver "took" R.C. out of state from Raymond in violation of the joint temporary 
restraining order, but still convicted her for "keeping andlor withholding" him 
from Calver. In addition, the jury would have had to have found that the state 
proved that Calver acted "without lawful authority" by some unexplained means 
other than a violation of the joint temporary restraining order. Such a 
circumstance of events is unlikely. It is exceedingly more likely, under the facts 
of this case, that the jury simply found that Calver violated the joint temporary 
restraining order, and rejected Calver's affirmative defense that there was 
imminent harm to R.C. or herself which justified the violation. 
Calver has failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions and, 
as such, has failed to show any basis for reversal of her conviction. 
III. 
Calver Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Her To Appellate 
Review Of Her Unpreserved Variance Claim 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Calver argues that there was a fatal variance 
between the jury instructions and the charging Information. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.29-33.) This Court must decline to review Calver's unpreserved variance 
claim because she has failed to demonstrate from the record that the 
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complained of variance rises to the level of fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the jury 
instructions at trial, and whether such variance is fatal to the conviction, are 
questions of law given free review on appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 
57,951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Because Calver Failed To Object Below, Her Claim Of A Variance Has 
Not Been Preserved For Appeal, And She Has Failed To Show 
Fundamental Error 
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts 
different from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 
100, 105 (1979). A variance also occurs where the jury instructions given at trial 
allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more 
alternative theories than alleged in the charging d?cument. See,~, State v. 
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 
160, 166,90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004). 
If it is established that a variance exists, the appellate court must 
examine whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the 
conviction. See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329, 33 P.3d 218, 220 (Ct. App. 
2001). A variance is fatal if it amounts to a "constructive amendment" or 
"deprives the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of 
double jeopardy." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 479, 272 P.3d 417, 451 (2012) 
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(quoting Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, 716 P .2d at 1189-90; State v. Wolfrum, 
145 Idaho 44, 47, 175 P.3d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 2007)). A constructive 
amendment occurs if a variance alters the charging document to the extent the 
defendant is tried for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature. Jones, 
140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889; State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 871 P.2d 
1225,1231 (Ct.App.1993). 
In addition, as discussed above, where, as here, the defendant did not 
object to the alleged error below, he has the burden of demonstrating 
fundamental error in order to obtain relief and satisfying the three prongs of the 
Perry fundamental error test. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226-228, 245 P.3d at 978-
980. 
For the first time on appeal, Calver contends that a fatal variance existed 
in this case because the charging information "alleged Raymond Calver's 
custodial or parental rights stem directly from the JTRO, not from anywhere 
else," but the jury instructions stated that Raymond's custodial or other parental 
rights arise either from the joint temporary restraining order or his "equal 
custodial rights." (Appellant's brief, pp.29-33.) 
Calver concedes she did not preserve her variance claim by way of a 
timely objection below, but argues she is nevertheless entitled to review of this 
claim and, ultimately, to relief thereon because the error is fundamental. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.29-33.) However application of this test to the facts of this 
case shows Calver has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that the 
variance she claims rises to the level of fundamental error. 
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The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Calver to 
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 
978. Calver appears to argue she has satisfied this step in the analysis merely 
by claiming a variance between the charging document and the jury instructions 
because such claim necessarily implicates her due process rights. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.30-31.) Calver is mistaken. Although an actual variance between the 
instructions and the allegations of a charging document implicates due 
process, ~, State v. Gilman, 105 Idaho 891, 893, 673 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Ct. 
App. 1983), no due process violation actually occurs unless the variance affects 
the defendant's substantial rights by either "depriv[ing] the defendant of his right 
to fair notice or leav[ing] him open to the risk of double jeopardy," State v. 
Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165, 90 P.3d 910, 915 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. 
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90 (1985) (footnote 
omitted)). 
Calver has failed to satisfy the first prong of Perry because she has failed 
to demonstrate a variance, let alone a fatal variance. As discussed above, I.C. 
§ 18-4506(a) requires that there be a qualified victim of the defendant's actions 
or omissions regarding the child. This victim may be either a parent of the 
child, some other person, or institution that has "custody, joint custody, visitation 
or other parental rights" over the child. I.C. § 18-4506(a). Relative to this 
element, the Information in this case alleged that Calver deprived Raymond, 
"who has joint custody and/or other parental rights arising from [sic] temporary 
restraining order regarding the child in CV-DR-2011-16503." (R., p.30.) Thus, 
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the information alleged that Raymond was a qualified victim pursuant to I.C. § 
18-4506(a), and that his custodial authority came from: (1) his joint custody, 
and/or (2) other parental rights arising from the temporary restraining order 
regarding the child in CV-DR-2001-16503? Contrary to Calver's suggestion on 
appeal, the information thus did not allege that Raymond's custodial authority 
came "directly from the JTRO, [and] not from anywhere else." 
Further, the jury instruction, with regard to this element, required the jury 
to find that Raymond "had the right to custody and/or other parental rights 
arising from a temporary restraining order regarding the child in CV-DR-2011-
16503." (R., p.80.) The jury instruction further clarified, "the right to custody 
includes custody, joint custody, visitation, or other parental rights, whether such 
rights arose from a temporary or permanent custody order or from the equal 
custodial rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order." (MJ 
There is no variance in this case. Although the statute, Information, and 
jury instruction each utilized slightly different language in addressing this 
element of the crime, they all discussed it in functionally similar terms that did 
not allow the jury to convict Calver for conduct not alleged in the Information. 
2 The state recognizes that Calver would construe the Information as instead 
alleging that Raymond Calver had "joint custody and/or other parental rights," 
either of which arose from, and exclusively from, "the temporary restraining 
order." While this is perhaps a plausible construction, it is a less than 
persuasive one because I.C. § 18-4506(a) does not require that the victim's 
custodial rights come from a court order. By the language of I.C. § 18-4506(a), 
"custody, joint custody, visitation or other parental rights" is enough to establish 
a "qualified victim," and those rights can come from custody orders, or simply 
from the equal custodial rights of each parent. In any event, Calver can hardly 
meet her burden to show "clear" fundamental error where there is such possible 
ambiguity. 
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The Information put Calver on notice that the state asserted that Raymond was 
a qualified victim under I.C. § 18-4506(a), on the basis of either his joint custody, 
or any other parental rights which arose from the custody order. The jury 
instructions likewise required the state to prove that Raymond was a qualified 
victim. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that any discrepancy between the language 
used in the Information and the jury instruction constitutes a variance, Calver 
has failed to carry her burden of establishing a variance of constitutional 
significance that requires reversal. Any variance in this case was clearly not 
fatal because Calver has failed to show it deprived her of her right to fair notice, 
left her open to the risk of double jeopardy, or constituted a constructive 
amendment. See Jones, 140 Idaho at 49,89 P.3d at 889. 
There is no indication in the record that, had Calver been provided the 
notice she claims the instructions deprived her of, she would have conducted 
her cross-examination of the state's witnesses any differently, or that she would 
have presented a different defense or theory of her case at trial. There is also 
no reasonable possibility that Calver could be subject to a second prosecution 
for the same offense. Finally, no variance in this case altered the charging 
document to the extent Calver was tried for a crime of a greater degree or of a 
different nature. Because Calver has failed to show her constitutional rights 
were violated by any variance, she has failed to satisfy the first element of Perry. 
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged 
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not 
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contained in the appel/ate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 
(footnote omitted). For the reasons discussed above, Calver cannot show plain 
or obvious error. Further, it is not clear from the appel/ate record that the 
decision of her trial counsel to not object to the jury instructions was based on 
ignorance of the law or other objective shortcomings, as opposed to being 
merely a tactical decision. Counsel may have deliberately chosen to forego 
objecting for any number of reasons, including counsel's determination that any 
variance was immaterial and did not prejudice Calver's ability to defend against 
the charges. 
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Calver to 
"demonstrate that the error affected [her] substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. As previously indicated, a variance 
affects the substantial rights of a defendant only "when it deprives the defendant 
of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy." 
Montoya, 140 Idaho at 165, 90 P.3d at 915 (citing Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-
78, 716 P.2d 1189-90 (footnote omitted». For the reasons already explained, 
Calver has failed to demonstrate that her substantial rights were affected by the 
variance she claims for the first time on appeal and has, therefore, failed to 
satisfy the final element of the Perry fundamental error analysis. 
Calver has failed to demonstrate that the jury instructions created a fatal 
variance with the Information. She has not shown how there was a constructive 
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amendment or that she has been deprived of her right to fair notice, or that the 
alleged variance leaves her open to the risk of double jeopardy. This Court 
should therefore affirm her conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Calver's conviction 
for felony custodial interference. 
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